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I.

INTRODUCTION

Prohibitions against torture and other forms of ill-treatment are wellrecognized as basic human rights in international law. However, despite
their basic nature, they are by no means simple for the judicial bodies
called upon to establish their existence and to condemn the States that
commit them.'
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has interpreted the
personal integrity provisions of Article 5 of the American Convention on
Human Rights in several cases, and has touched on many of the important
issues with regard to respecting human dignity, torture and cruel, inhuman,

*
The author graduated cum laude from Harvard Law School in 1997. During 1998,
she was a staff attorney for the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in San Jos6, Costa Rica.
Currently, she is the Program Officer for the Due Process of Law Foundation, an organization
which promotes human rights through reform of justice systems and training of judicial personnel
throughout the Americas.
1.
"However basic this human right may seem, it is most complex indeed." Clovis C.
Morrisson, DYNAMICS OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION
SYSTEM 72 (1981); "Judicial attempts to interpret these concepts or to distinguish clearly among
them [torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment] in case law have proven difficult."
Torture in the Eighties:an Amnesty InternationalReport, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
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and degrading treatment.2 In interpreting Article 5, the Court is faced with
the inter-relation between its six provisions, creating a threshold which
must be passed to find a violation, distinctions between differing levels of
violations, as well as many other issues relating to how far the Court is
willing to go in interpreting this broadly written article.
II.

STRUCTURE OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON

HUMAN RIGHTS
The American Convention on Human Rights protects the integrity of
persons in very broad terms, and explicitly includes not only the physical
integrity but also the psychological and moral integrity of persons. Article
5(l) establishes that "[e]very person has the right to have his physical,
3
mental, and moral integrity respected. "
Other treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), do not specifically list psychological and moral
integrity in their texts. However, in the case of the ICCPR, the related
United Nations Human Rights Committee stated in its General Comments
on the Convention that the prohibition against torture or cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment "[r]elates not only to acts that cause physical pain
but also to acts that cause mental suffering to the victim. "' Therefore,
although the text of the American Convention is more explicit than other
conventions in its inclusion of non-physical integrity, this conception of
personal integrity is recognized in other systems.
Although the European Convention on Human Rights does not
explicitly include psychological and moral suffering, the European Court of
Human Rights has also interpreted its personal integrity provisions to
include protection against moral suffering and degrading treatment that
creates a sense of fear, anxiety and inferiority in order to humiliate,
degrade and break the victim's resistance.'
This European standard
including psychological trauma has been cited and adopted by the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights in a recent case. 6
The American Convention also prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment, in the common terms of other human rights
2.
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 ILM 673, OEA/Ser.
K/XVI/1.1, doc. 65. rev. 1, corr. 1, (1970) [hereinafter The Convention], art. 5.
3.
Id. art. 5(1).
4.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, General Comment 20 on Article 7. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm.,
44th Sess., at 24-25.
5.
Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct.H.R. (ser. A) (1975).
6.
Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Judgment of September 17, 1997. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser.
C) No. 33 (1997), para. 57.
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documents," and goes on in the same provision to prohibit treatment of
detained persons that does not show full respect for human dignity.8
The remaining provisions of Article 5 deal with the further rights of
detainees to be separated based on conviction or pre-trial status and age,
and lays out reform and rehabilitation as the only proper goal of
imprisonment. These provisions, and the right for detainees to be treated
with the respect due human dignity in Article 5(2) are rights usually
thought of separately from the right to be free of torture and cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment. 9
For example, the ICCPR lists torture and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment in Article 7 and the rights of detained persons in
Article 10.10 However, the practice of the Human Rights Committee,
which hears complaints based on that treaty, has been to find violations of
both of these two provisions when detainees have been found to have been
The
tortured or suffered cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment."
Committee also has found that treatment due detainees under Article 10(1)
goes further than just a prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment." It also includes ensuring conditions that are not
detrimental to their health."
This sort of consideration is important in the evaluation of the
treatment that the Inter-American Court gives to Article 5, since it also
includes provisions on the rights of prisoner and is therefore quite broad. 14
The Inter-American Court, to this date, has only ruled on violations
relating to torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and conditions
and treatment that are not respectful of human dignity. The other
provisions of Article 5 have not been directly interpreted. Therefore, this
paper will focus on these provisions, which, as already noted, include
conditions of confinement cases. However, in the Court's jurisprudence,
7.
For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1984 Convention on
Torture, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the European Convention
on Human Rights.
8.
The Convention, supra note 2, art. 5(2).
9.
Id. art. 5(2).
10. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 7 and 10. [hereinafter
ICCPRJ.
See U.N. Human Rights Committee, Selected Decisions under the Optional Protocol,
11.
2nd - 16th Sess, U.N. CCPC/CIOP/1, Communication. No. 4 (1977) Communication. No. 5
(1977), No. 8/1977. See also Committee's decision in Communication no. 161 (1983) 31st Sess.
12.
See U.N. Human Rights Committee, Selected Decisions under the Optional Protocol
(2nd - 16th Sessions), U.N. CCPC/C/OP/1, Communication No. 5 (1977).
13. Id.
14. Id.
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as discussed further below, distinctions between the different types of
violations of these provisions are not always clear. This lack of clarity
may lead to difficulty when the further provisions of Article 5 are reached,
since these provisions would naturally include violations that do not reach
the level of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or torture.
III.

CREATING ATHRESHOLD FOR VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES
5(1) AND 5(2)
With respect to violations of Article 5(1) and (2), it is important to
initially address separately the first two provisions and to establish a
minimum threshold which must be crossed in the treatment of the victims
in order to show their personal integrity has been violated or that they have
suffered torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. 5 Some
punishment is necessary in criminal systems, but the Convention
establishes that certain types of punishments, conditions, and treatments of
any person are restricted in order to preserve the sacredness of the human
person. This right is so fundamental that, unlike other important rights, no
exceptions to the right to humane treatment are allowed, even under a state
of emergency or war. 1 6 Ironically, even the right to life can be excepted,
particularly
in the American Convention, which provides for the death
17
penalty.
Therefore, an important task is the creation of a threshold, which can
incorporate even the most minor violations of these two provisions of the
article and which can never be crossed without condemnation. 18 The
creation of a substantive, legal threshold which must be reached in order to
hold a State responsible is a task which sometimes becomes blurred in the
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court with the level of proof necessary
to prove the facts underlying these violations.
The extensive protections provided in Article 5 leave an interpretation
of this article available that could be quite broad in its protection of the
individual rights it enshrines. With its definition of the integrity to be
15. See The Convention, supra note 2.
16. The Convention, supra note 2, art. 5(2), See also, Hans Haug, Revista International
de la Cruz Roja, 'Instrnuentos de Derecho InternacionalPgblicopara Ljchar contra la Tortura,
Aflo 14, No. 91, enero-febrero 1989, at 10-11 (discussing article 7 of the ICCPR); Ireland v.
United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser A) (1978), Judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A, No.
25.
17. Despite its abolitionist provisions which do not allow expansion or reinstitution of the
death penalty, the Convention provides for the continuance of the death penalty in countries that
establish it prior to signing on to the Convention. See The Convention, supra note 2.
18.
Torture in the Eighties: An Amnesty International Report, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, at 15; See also Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser A) (1978).
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protected as that of the whole being rather than physical torture alone,
modern psychological and other tortures can easily be covered 9 as well as
physical mistreatments. Further, though the provisions cover the more
egregious "tortures," which call to the mind a special degree of disgust, it
also covers any treatment which is cruel, inhuman or degrading to the
physical, mental or moral integrity of the person.
Yet the threshold of what can constitute a violation of personal
integrity under this article does not stop with this type of treatment, but
further restricts the treatment that can be forced on a detainee to that which
is respectful of human dignity. Since the provision already includes
"degrading treatment," in order to read this provision to have some
purpose, it would appear that the meaning would be of a treatment that
might or might not reach the level covered by "degrading treatment."
Thus, it could be found that the article restricts more treatments than just
those that reach the level of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.
A further interpretation of Article 5(1) and (2) could also incorporate
Article 5(6), with regard to prisoners, and could find further protections in
the mandate that the deprivation of their liberty can have no other purpose
than rehabilitation and reform. A violation of Article 5 could be held to be
inherent in any incarceration that does not live up to this standard,
including possibly any incommunicado holding, disappearance, or other
illegal detention since no arbitrary detention could truly have reform or
rehabilitation as its goal. With regard to disappearances, in the Velfisquez
Rodriguez and Godinez Cruz cases, the Court found a presumed violation
of Article 5. Also, the Court has previously ruled that the condition of
incommunicado alone is enough to violate the prohibition against cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment.'
However, the Court has not always
followed these decisions.
IV.

THRESHOLD FOR PRESUMPTIONS OF ARTICLE 5 VIOLATIONS AND
ISSUES OF PROOF

The Court has not yet articulated a presumption based on Article 5(6).
However, it has found in several cases that a presumption that the threshold
for Article 5(1) and 5(2) violations exists with regard to certain types of
detention.
Clearly from its first treatment of forced disappearances in Velasquez
Rodrfguez and Godinez Cruz, the Court found, without any direct evidence
19.
"The methods of torture are either physical or psychological." Lone Jacobsen &
Peter Vesti, Torture Survivors-A New Group of Patients: The DanishNurses' Org. (1990).
20. Suirez Rosero v. Ecuador, Judgment of November 12, 1997, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 35 (1997); See also Loayza Tamayo, supra note 6.
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of a violation to physical well-being, that a violation of Article 5 could be
presumed in disappearance cases given the psychological and moral effects
of being held incommunicado and the prolonged isolations which are
inherently part of a disappearance.2 1 The Court noted that these violations
constituted cruel and inhuman treatment and injured the personal integrity
of the victim and the right of detained persons to be treated in a way
respectful of human dignity.' From this case it is clear that mental and
emotional forms of ill-treatment are clearly being accepted by the Court, in
line with the Convention's protection of a broadly defined personal
integrity, which includes the psychological and moral aspects in addition to
the physical.
The threshold for the Court's finding of a violation in disappearances,
it would have appeared from this case, was therefore the isolation which is
This inherent violation passed the legal
inherent in a disappearance.
threshold to include both disrespect for human dignity and cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment. However, in a similar case where disappearance
was once again proven, the Court found only that human dignity had been
disrespected and did not find cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.?
The Court did not refer in that case to the isolation inherent in a
disappearance but rather to the fact, which had been proven by eyewitness
accounts, that the victim had been put into the trunk of a vehicle.'
Similarly in the Paniagua Morales case, although the Court declared
the existence of the practice of forced disappearance and illegal detention
accompanied by mistreatment and torture,' it would not presume the
existence of violations of Article 5 with regard to these violations, despite
its previous decision in the Velfisquez Rodriguez and Godinez Cruz cases. 26
Therefore, some of the victims were not found to have had their Article 5
rights violated despite the incommunicado nature of their detention.
This is especially confusing in light of the Court's emphasis on this
type of isolation in the Sufrez Rosero and Loayza Tamayo cases which
both concerned incommunicado detentions. These cases tend to follow,
and in the case of the Su~rez Rosero case, explicitly states, ideas similar to
21. Vellsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras. Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 4 (1988), paras. 156, 187.
22. Id.
23. Castillo Paez v. Peru, Judgment of November 3, 1997, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C)
No. 34 (1997), para. 66.
24. Id.
25. Paniagua Morales v. Guatemala, Judgment of March 8, 1998, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 37 (1998), para. 89(a).
26. Id. para. 134-135.
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that of the Velfsquez Rodriguez and Godinez Cruz cases: That isolation
alone constitutes a treatment disrespectful of human dignity and cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment. 27 Further, the Court has cited the
European Court's decision that stated that illegal detention is an
aggravating factor given the vulnerability of the victim in these
circumstances. 28
These cases seemingly rejected a prior case that had possibly limited
the presumption that arbitrary detention and isolation inherently violate
Article 5. In the Gangaran Panday case, the Court found that in the
absence of definitive proof of mistreatment of the victim, who committed
suicide during his detention which the Court determined was arbitrary and
illegal based on inference of fact did not permit it to presume violations of
Articles 5(1) and 5(2) based purely on the arbitrary nature of the
detention.2 9
Moreover, given the lack of proof of torture or mistreatment of others
by government officials, the Court found that the applicants had not
demonstrated a governmental practice from which the Court could presume
the victim was tortured or mistreated' 3 The refusal to use a similar
presumption in this case was based on the fact that no pattern of
mistreatment was shown nor specifically any mistreatment of the victim.
With regard to cases where the Court has not used its presumption
despite the existence of a proven pattern or practice of isolated detentions
and mistreatment of detainees, the Court instead weighed the medical
evidence of torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment it had
available.31 The victims who did not present medical reports showing
physical signs of ill-treatment were found to have not suffered it. Given
the difficulty of obtaining medical evidence, especially if one is held for
some time or tortured using techniques that do not leave easily identified
signs,32 the Court's failure to use presumptions may have an impact on
future cases. This may be especially true, since the Court has sometimes

27. See generally, Sulrez Rosero, supra note 20 and Loayza Tamayo, supra note 6.
28. Loayza Tamayo, supra note 6. pan. 57, citing Ribitsch v. Austria, Eur. Ct. H. R.,
(ser. A) (1995).
29. Gangaram Panday v. Suriname, Judgment of January 21, 1994, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 16 (1994).
30. Id. para. 64.
31.
See Paniagua Morales, supra note 26.
32.
Henry Kruger, EVIDENCE OF TORTURE: STUDIES BY THE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
MEDICAL GROUP 7 (1977).
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been unwilling to find contested facts to be proven based solely on the
testimony of the victim.33
In cases where specific mistreatment of the victims was shown, the
Court has still been willing to find that this was the responsibility of the
State. However, the Paniagua Morales case tends to set up a standard that
a pattern and specific medical evidence of the mistreatment should be
shown rather than just showing a connection to the pattern of
disappearances or illegal detentions which included such mistreatment.
In SuArez Rosero, the Court was faced with a living victim whose
testimony and that of his family included claims of beatings,
incommunicado detention, and poor conditions of conf'mement. 34 The
Court could not specifically use the European standard that an injury
proven to have occurred while in the sole custody of the State is presumed
to be caused by the State. However, absent a sufficient rebuttal,3 5 the
Court did find that given the incommunicado nature of the first part of his
detention, only the victim and the State could have evidence.3 Therefore,
without evidence to the contrary offered by the State, the Court would give
weight to the testimony and claims of the victim. 37
In other words, after proving isolated detention and making initial
Article 5 claims the burden shifted to the State to show the claims were
untrue. Such a shift of the burden of proof is in line with the nature of
these detentions recognized in the prior cases that established the
presumption of Article 5 violations in disappearance cases. Thus, not only
has the Court on occasion found cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
and disrespect to human dignity based solely on isolation, but it also has
used isolation to shift the burden of proof in attempting to prove other,
more egregious, violations.

33.

See Paniagua Morales, supra note 26 (despite the fact that the Court found the

victims had been detained in a pattern that included beatings and mistreatment and that the
Commission had argued any injury claimed in custody should be found to be the responsibility of

the State absent a rebuttal, the Court denies claims of those who do not present actual medical
evidence of their allegations); Loayza Tamayo, supra note 6, para. 58 on the issue of rape; But
see, Sudrez Rosero, supra note 20 para. 33 (Court discusses in a case where the State did not

rebut the victim's allegations that the State is the party that has access to the facts).
34. SuArez Rosero, supra note 20, para. 23.
35.

The European Court found that in a case where it was undisputed that injuries were

sustained during detention by the police that the government was "under an obligation to provide a
plausible explanation of how the applicant's injuries were caused." Ribitsch v. Austria, 336 Eur.

Ct. H. R (Ser.A) (1995), para. 34.
36. Sudrez Rosero, spra note 20, para. 33.
37.

Id.
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The United Nations Human Rights Committee has addressed this issue
by stating the following:
With regard to the burden of proof, the Committee has already
established in other cases (for example, Nos. 30/1978 and
85/1981) that this cannot rest alone on the author of the
communication, especially considering that the author and the
State party do not always have equal access to the evidence and
that frequently the State party alone has access to relevant
information. In those circumstances, due weight must be given to
the author's allegations.'
This decision was based on the obligation of the State to investigate
such allegations fully, presumably because if the State had fulfilled this
obligation it would have had the information necessary to rebut or explain
the allegations. Since this obligation exists in the Inter-American System
as well, this conception of the burden of proof should be equally relevant
in the Court's analysis. The Court's first decision is evidence of this,
given its statement that the States "[c]annot rely on the defense that the
complainant has failed to present evidence when it cannot be obtained
without the State's cooperation."" A combination of this flexibility in the
burden of proof and the presumptions can go a long way in remedying the
problems facing victims in establishing their claims of mistreatment.
V.

DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN TORTuRE AND CRUEL, INHUMANE AND

DEGRADING TREATMENT
Once the threshold or presumption has been met, which is perhaps the
most important step in the interpretation, it also becomes important to
determine the various levels of violation possible under Article 5. This is
important for many reasons. First, the State must not only be condemned
for a "violation of Article 5" but should also be stigmatized by the labels
38.

Supra note 4.

39. Velasquez Rodrfguez v. Honduras, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. C) No. 4 (1988). In this and the other Honduras Case of Godfnez Cruz, the Court defined
the standard of proof necessary to prove violations of the rights contained in the American
Convention in a way that allowed the applicant to show a governmental practice of violations and
a link between the individual case brought and the practice through circumstantial evidence and
presumptions consistent with the facts. The Court noted that, given that "[s]tates do not appear
before the Court as defendants in a criminal action," and further that the purpose of the
proceedings was "[tlo protect the victims and to provide for the reparation of damages resulting
from the acts of the States responsible" for violations of their rights the Court has more flexibility
than domestic criminal courts in determining the criteria for weighing evidence. Id. paras. 127,
128 and 134.
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which truly mark the atrocities it has committed. If a state has allowed,
condoned, or participated actively in "torture," it should be condemned for
this practice by name by the international community and not allowed to
While all violations are to be
escape with a less stigmatizing label.'
condemned and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment is as violatory of
the Convention as torture, the severity of the violation must not be
overlooked.
Not only should the Court look to condemn violations generally but,
because the Inter-American system is based on individual complaints, the
horrors committed against each victim should be discovered, where
possible, and condemned, even if it is easier to stop at a simple crossing of
the threshold and a general denunciation. Through this recognition, the
State can be asked to compensate the victim for the extent of their suffering
and also so that the judgment can serve as what the Court often sees as the
per se international recognition of the responsibility of the State for the
atrocities committed. 4 '
One major distinction that can be drawn is between torture and cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment. The European Court has distinguished
succinctly between these two types of violations in its groundbreaking,
although criticized,42 case of Ireland v. United Kingdom. In that case, the
European Court found that the various forms of ill-treatment should be
The writers of the European
separated and defined individually.
Convention, that Court noted, meant to give meaning to all the parts of the
prohibition and therefore each must be seen as adding something to the
provisions. The term "torture", they found, carried a special "stigma"
which should be applied to "deliberate inhuman treatment causing very
serious and cruel suffering. "4 As noted above, it is because of this stigma
that it is important for the determination of which form of violation has
occurred in each case, even though all violations should be condemned.
This idea that torture is a more grave form of cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment is supported by the United Nation's definition of
torture, which the European Court cites, that calls torture "an aggravated
and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
40.

Even Amnesty International. whose report calls for all violations to be condemned

regardless of distinctions, recognizes the special stigma inherent in the term "torture. " TORTURE
iN THE FIGHTIEs, supra note 1, at 15.
41. The Court has often denied requests by the Commission and victims for an apology
or public announcement by the State. stating that its judgment by itself constitutes international
recognition of responsibility.
42. Torture in the Eighties, supra note 18 at 14-15.
43. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H. .R.(ser. A) (1978), supra note 18, para.
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punishment. "" However, as the Ireland case shows, the European Court
used this criteria to detern "e that the infamous "five techniques"
complained of in that case were not of the "intensity" that the word torture
implies,4" and instead deemed them cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment.' Such an approach, which is followed by the Inter-American
Court in its cases,47 has been criticized for making the lower threshold of
what constitutes cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment severe enough to
be called "torture. ,48
This approach also requires the use of a case-by-case analysis which
leaves the Courts open to criticisms of subjectiveness and a lack of
objective factors.4 9 However, as the comments of the United Nations
Human Rights Committee regarding the torture and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment article of the ICCPR states:
[Tihat Covenant does not contain any definition of the concepts
covered by Article 7 [the torture and cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment article], nor does the Committee consider it
necessary to draw up a list of prohibited acts or to establish sharp
distinctions between the different kinds of punishment or
treatment; the distinctions depend on the nature, purpose and
severity of the treatment applied. 5°
This is similar to the approach of the European Court and leaves
the judging body discretion to make distinctions based on any criteria it
deems relevant to its determination.
The Inter-American Court has followed a similar path, although at
times its distinctions and interpretations of what fits within the terms of the
Convention have been inconsistent and confusing. The Court, based on the
structure of Article 5(1) and (2) discussed above, has used different
distinctions: torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and
treatment disrespectful of human dignity.
With Loayza Tamayo, the Court found that the victim had some
medical evidence and witnesses that testified to abuses similar to those she
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

d.
Id.
Id. para. 168.
Loayza Tamayo, supra note 6, para. 57.
Torture in the Eighties, supra note 1, at 15.

49.

La Integridad Personal en el Derecho Internacional (A prop6sito de ia Convenci6n de

las Naciones Uniones contra la tortura), Miguel Villavicencio C., Boleffn Coinisi6n Andina de
Juristas, matzo 1990, No. 24, 28-29.
50. Supra note 4.
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complained of suffering in the same prison." The victim complained in
this case of traditional torture techniques such as "submarine torture,"
beatings and sexual torture, yet the Court found only cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment based on the facts it considered proven.52 However,
the Court did find the State responsible for cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment based on the other claims including conditions of confinement,
the incommunicado nature of her detention, beatings and other
mistreatments.53

The Court did include in this case recognition that different grades of
violations from torture to other lesser types.' The Court also noted the
European Court's definitions of inhumane treatment and degrading
treatment as including psychological suffering, but did not make a point of
distinguishing strictly between "inhuman" and "degrading" treatment as the
European Court has.55 While recognizing as well that illegal detention
aggravates the vulnerability of the detained person,' the Court does not use
this aggravating factor to find torture rather than cruel, inhuman and
degading treatment.
In determining the distinction between the three different types of
violations used by the Court, several other cases are also illustrative. In
the Paniagua Morales case, the Court had three different types of victims
with regard to Article 5.57 All victims had been arbitrarily kidnapped and
held prisoner, although as previously mentioned, the presumption that this
isolation constituted ill-treatment of any kind was not mentioned by the
Court. The first set of victims had been held and had not, in the Court's
criteria, proven any violence against them or poor conditions of
confinement despite claims by some of them that they were beaten. 5 The
Court rejected their allegations of Article 5 violations. 59 For those victims
who had survived the detention and had shown the Court medical proof of
beatings, the Court determined they had been subjected to cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment.'
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
(1978).
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Loayza Tamayo, supra note 6.
Id. paras. 58 and 46.
Id. para. 58.
Id.
Id. paras. 58 and 57. See also Ireland v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H. R.,(ser. A)
Id. para. 57.
Paniagua Morales, supra note 26.
Id. para. 66.
Id. para. 135.
Id.
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The victims who had been murdered by their captors, for whom the
Court had the autopsy reports which showed the treatment of the victims
before their deaths, and given the gravity of the suffering obviously caused
by the treatment shown in these reports, were deemed to have been
tortured. 6' Given that the particular violations in the case of the deceased
victims were especially gruesome, ' this decision was not a difficult one
with regard to whether it was "intense" enough to qualify under the test for
"torture."
This intensity test, which is similar to the European Court's, was
adopted by the Inter-American Court to distinguish between "torture" and
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment,' although the Court does not
distinguish between cruel, inhuman and degrading as the European Court
has done. 64 The intensity standard, as mentioned previously, can be
criticized based on its subjectivity. However, the Court seemed to prefer
not to list a more specific definition.
As with any subjective standard, the facts of each case must be
weighed in order to determine if a violation has occurred, and if so, what
level it reaches. This raises another serious issue in physical integrity
cases: what is necessary to prove the facts involved? As noted above,
torture and its various techniques are not always easy to demonstrate
medically, and this can be especially true in cases involving long detentions
where access to a doctor can be restricted or where the victim is too afraid
to seek medical attention immediately. Therefore, in any discussion of
torture and the various levels of violations to physical integrity rights, the
related standard of proof issues must be addressed both in terms of the
Court's general standard of proof and that concerning Article 5
specifically.
VI. OTHER ARTICLE 5 ISSUES TREATED BY THE COURT
A greater number of cases coming before the Court each year include
more varied violations (other than disappearances and right to life).
Therefore, the Court should begin to reach those issues which it may have
found easier to dismiss in earlier cases where the more "obvious" or
"egregious" violations made it possible to dismiss the lesser or more
complicated claims while still finding the State responsible. Some issues
61.
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dealing with Article 5 outside of the Court's standard disappearance and
detention cases have been raised in past cases, though many more exist and
will eventually need to be confronted by the Court.
In a case where the more egregious violations were not under the
Court's jurisdiction, the Court was confronted with claims concerning the
Article 5 rights of the family of a disappearance victim whose
disappearance was covered-up by the State. These rights, creatively, were
found to be violated since the disappearance and burning of the body of
their family member directly caused suffering and gravely affected their
lives .'
The Inter-American Court has not adequately addressed the distinction
between direct and indirect victims, and this becomes apparent in this
expansion of Article 5 rights to psychological and moral integrity of
relatives of the primary victim, which the Blake case finds to be directly
affected by violations to another person. However, this finding has not
been used in other cases to find family members to be direct victims where
the primary crime was under the Court's jurisdiction, which gives the
unfortunate impression that the Court was simply extending this
interpretation in the Blake case because of its finding that the victim's
disappearance could not be adjudicated because it occurred before the
violating State became a Party to the jurisdiction of the Court.'
In another important area that might be covered under Article 5, the
Court has not yet directly addressed the death row phenomenon which is
said to cause mental anguish to prisoners awaiting death sentences. This
issue, faced by the European Court in the famous Soering case, has been
raised before the Court in its decision on provisional measures in a matter
involving death row prisoners in Trinidad and Tobago.' While the State
argued that the Court should not ask it to delay their executions further
because of internal time limits established to avoid the "cruel and unusual
punishment" of extended death row stays, the Court did not reach this issue
and ordered the stay of execution without any discussion of this substantive
issue raised by the State.'
With regard to whether violations of Article 5 can be found in a case
where death is presumed to have occurred and whether a violent death
might be considered to violate Article 5 represented two issues that were
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addressed by the Court in the Neira Alegria case.6 In that case, involving
the disappearance of prisoners during a prison riot, the Court decided to
reject the argument of the Inter-American Commission that the right to not
be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment was violated,
without evidence that such treatment occurred during the alleged detention
of the victim.' Further, the Court concluded that "[w]hile the deprivation
of a person's life could also be understood as an injury to his or her
personal integrity, this is not the meaning of [Article 5] of the
Convention."71 This concept, that Article 5 does not refer to all injuries to
the victim's body even in the case of a disappearance implies that an
element of prolonged suffering is part of the Court's definition of the
treatments included in the prohibitions of Article 5.
The Court has been reluctant also in issues that affect women. For
example, in the Loayza Tamayo case, the Court did not find for the victim
on her claims of sexual tortures, thereby dodging an important and wellrecognized type of torture. 2 The Court, which has only had one female
member since its creation, must overcome whatever timidity it has to
dealing with women's issues. This will be especially true not only given
the use of sexual tortures against women and men, but also for other
Article 5 issues which may arise later. For example, whether a state could
be found responsible for domestic violence (an assault to personal integrity
rights) in its jurisdiction if the State condones it or does not attempt to.
VII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Court must continue to clarify its interpretation of
Article 5(l) and 5(2). A threshold for violating these first two provisions
should be clearly established, and presumptions should be used to allow
victims to meet this threshold based on the nature of their detentions which
can make them especially vulnerable to physical violence as well as
inherently causing them mental and moral anguish. At least, a shift in the
burden of proof as in the Sufirez Rosero case should occur in these
situations. The burden of proof should be clearly established but should
not overburden the victim, since, as the Court has noted, it is often only
the State that holds access to proof other than the victim's testimony.
Deciding where the threshold of a violation lies and the distinctions
between the different levels of violations (lack of respect for human
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dignity, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, or torture) are subjective,
evolving along with society's conceptions, and will always, therefore, be
open to criticism. However, the stigma inherent in the terms themselves
should be used to vindicate the victim and recognize the extent of the
State's responsibility. More complicated situations and types of violations
must be addressed fully. The Court should not stop at simply crossing the
threshold without condemning all of the violations it can find in any given
case.
The Court will surely be faced with various types of violations of
Article 5. Cases involving detainees' rights will surely also follow and the
Court must be clear on its interpretation of the first two provisions of
Article 5 in order to prepare itself to deal with the overlapping remaining
provisions which will have their own, presumably lower, threshold of
mistreatment.

